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former seems to fit better in atheistic discourse. Fair enough, but this
results in moral concepts not having the same meaning as they do in
theistic discourse. 3 In reply to Beardsmore, James Conant ("Reply:
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Anscombe on Moral Unintelligibility")
gives a careful analysis of the way three very different philosophers
have answered the question of whether one can divorce morality from
religion without losing morality's intelligibility.
There are so many important insights in and aspects to the papers in
this book that 1 cannot possibly mention them all in this brief review.
This is an outstanding collection and an important contribution to the
ongoing discussion about the relationship between morality and religion. I highly recommend this book to graduate students as well as
professors of philosophy, theology, and religious studies.
NOTES
1.
See, for example, Janine Marie Idziak, "In Search of 'Good
Positive Reasons' for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of
Arguments," in Readings In Christian Ethics, Volume 1: Theory and Method,
eds. David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1994), 50-61.
2.
Some political philosophers in the Kantian tradition, such as John
Rawls, believe such a divorce between metaphysics and politics is essential to a just regime. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993). For a discussion of this question by two
Christian philosophers, see Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion
in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
3.
See George 1. Mavrodes, "Religion and the Queerness of
Morality," in Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Committment, eds. Robert
Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1986); and J.P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist?: The Debate
Between Theists and Atheists (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 97-135.

Olltological Arguments and Belief in Cod, by Graham Oppy. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xviii, 376. $59.95 (Cloth)
ROBERT OAKES, Saint Louis University
Professor Oppy's ambitious book may well provide the most comprehensive coverage of ontological arguments that can be found to date. It
is hard to identify another book on the topic which constitutes as rich
and extensive a source for such arguments. Oppy has managed to pull
together a remarkable wealth of material, and it seems a safe bet that
there is no type of ontological argument developed thus far that is worthy of philosophical note but not presented and carefully assessed in this
text. Thus, what we have here is arguably nothing short of an intellectual Feast of St. Anselm. Oppy discusses (these are his categorizations)
Definitional arguments, Conceptual arguments, Modal arguments'
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Meinongian arguments, Experiential arguments (an intriguing type of
ontological argument that seems worthy of more attention than has
come its way thus far) and "Hegelian" arguments. Also, the last (roughly) 40% of the book consists of an exceedingly valuable section entitled
"literature notes," which Oppy includes in order to "provide more
detailed textual support for some of the contentions made in the main
text" (p. 200). Immediately following this is very likely the most thorough bibliography currently to be had on ontological arguments and
related topics.
It seems to me that Oppy's treatment of his topic is, in the main,
philosophically adept and judicious. A clearly meritorious feature of the
book is that, while his appraisal of ontological arguments is firmly and
unyieldingly negative, his polemic is consistently and admirably workmanlike. Alternatively, he is commendably scrupulous in his overall
effort to show that ontological arguments have little to recommend
them. This should not, however, be taken to imply that all of Oppy's
observations and argumentation are uniformly insightful. Indeed, one
finds contentions that range from the seriously problematic to the dialectically bizarre (or what some Latin buffs might be tempted to characterize as clear cases of Argumentum ad Preposterum).
It seems to me that a paradigmatic example of the latter makes up
footnote #5 in the chapter dealing with the uses of parody as a (classical)
way of responding to ontological arguments. Talk of "perfect islands"thanks, of course, to Gaunilo-has come to be a virtual sine qua non of
any effort to parody Anselmian arguments, and it is clear that Oppy is
no exception in this regard. Here is the relevant footnote (p. 167):
How could there be an island than which no greater island can be
conceived-i.e., an island that cannot even be conceived not to
exist-given that God has the power to annihilate
everything ... Surely the acknowledgement that God would have the
power to annihilate an island than which no greater island can be
conceived is an acknowledgement that it is inconceivable that there
is an island than which no greater island can be conceived.
What is really remarkable is that Oppy is not in the least tentative about
this argument. (Note the use of the word "surely"). Oppy is entirely
confident that it is not within the compass of God's omnipotence to
destroy an island than which a greater is inconceivable. Accordinglygiven the unimpeachability of the principle that, necessarily, God can
destroy whatever He can create-it follows transparently that it is not
within the power of God to create such an island. Hence, the greatest
conceivable island would (like God Himself) have to be self-existent.
However, and even allowing the (problematic) thesis that 'being of kind
K that is maximally great' constitutes a coherent function, it is hard to
see just what there could be to mitigate the intuitive preposterousness of
the contention that the greatest conceivable island-or, for that matter,
the greatest conceivable softball or greatest conceivable mountain passwould have to possess aseity, and, accordingly, be impervious to Divine
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omnipotence.
For a good example of the seriously problematic-in contradistinction, of course, to the preposterous-we need simply to consult the page
immediately preceding (p. 166). In maintaining that Plantinga's case
against the notion of the greatest conceivable island is "inconclusive,"
Oppy goes on to suggest (following P. Grim) that Plantinga's strictures
on that score constitute a polemical boomerang; i.e., can be used to make
a very strong case against the idea ,pf the greatest conceivable being.
How so? Well, what Oppy proffers here is a (basically inverted) version
of the "best conceivable world" argument long associated with Leibniz.
Here is how it goes: it is axiomatic that the greatest conceivable b e i n g
could not fail to create the greatest conceivable world. However, there
can be no greatest conceivable world: "no matter how great a world ...
there could always be a greater-that is, one with an even greater number of admirable beings." Accordingly, there could not conceivably exist
a maximally great world. The response to this argument seems readily
apparent: if there could indeed be no such thing as a maximally great
world-i.e., if the notion of such a world is incoherent-then no actualizable world could possibly fit the description "the greatest conceivable
world." How, then, could the greatest conceivable being coherently be
expected to actualize such a "world?" This would be on the order of
claiming that God can coherently be expected to actualize (or create) free
slaves. However, even if we allow that there is a greatest conceivable
world, how is it clear that it would not be entirely in order for the greatest conceivable being to actualize some lesser world? Robert Merrihew
Adams has a very elegant argument-unfortunately ignored by Oppyin support of precisely this thesis. 2
All of this aside, however, it seems to me that the most serious difficulty with Oppy's overall project is his tendency to ride roughshod over
important epistemic distinctions. Alternatively, his polemic would seem
to be seriously vitiated by epistemological confusion. Here is Oppy's initial statement of his central thesis, as set forth in the first page of the
Preface: " ... ontological arguments do not provide an agnostic with any
good reason to change her view-that is, to give up her agnosticism"
(xi). This gets refined just a bit on the subsequent page:
the main thesis for which I wish to argue is this: that ontological arguments do not
give dispositionally reasonable agnostics-theists 3 atheists-a reason to
change their views" (xii). Alternatively, "there is nothing in ontological
arguments that should bring a procedurally reasonable agnostic-theist,
atheist-to think that he has been systematically irrational" (xiii).
Accordingly, Oppy tends to see conceptual equivalence (or at least
mutual entailment) between (a) Ontological arguments do not provide judicious unbelievers with a reason for converting to theism, and (b) Ontological
arguments should not cause judicious unbelievers (or disbelievers) fo conclude
that their unbelief (disbelief) has been irrational.
This clearly seems misguided, however. Examples are easy to construct. Imagine two dear friends-Don and Sam-who go off together on
a trip to Europe. Unfortunately, their aircraft malfunctions and crashes
into the ocean. Don manages to survive without serious injury, but is
/f •••
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unable to locate Sam, and, accordingly, is quite worried about him. As it
turns out, Sam too has managed to survive without serious injury. Each
of them is floating in the water on his inflatable seat cushion, but they are
at a considerable distance from each other in the water. Finally, Don happens to spot the person who is Sam (at a distance of about a quarter mile).
While Don is strongly inclined to believe that the person whom he sees is
indeed Sam, he is sufficiently judicious to be less than fully confident
about that since Sam's features can only be discerned rather vaguely given
the distance involved. (Don calls out to Sam, yelling his name, but, once
again, due to the distance, Sam is unable to hear). Now it turns out that
Don has a small portable radio in his pocket that has (mirable dictu)
remained in working order. Upon switching it on, he manages to pick up
some news about the crash. (Helicopters are circling overhead, and their
survey of the crash site is presumably the source of the information on the
radio.) The announcer reports that the initial estimate of loss of life in the
disaster is placed at a staggering 98% of those on board.
Here, then, is Don's epistemic situation: he clearly has some justification for believing (what is true, i.e.,) that Sam has survived the crash:
namely, that the person whom he has cited looks a lot like Sam-albeit,
of course, from a distance that precludes anything close to foolproof
identification. However, his having this justification for believing that
Sam has survived does not entail that it would be irrational of Don to
believe that Sam has not survived. Rather, what he hears on the radio
might rightly be regarded as justification which epistemically trumps his
perceptual evidence for regarding the person off in the distance as Sam.
Hence, for any person N and proposition p, N's having justification for
believing that p does not entail that it would be irrational of N not to
believe that p. Accordingly, even allowing (as I am glad to do only for
present purposes) that there is nothing about ontological arguments that
would rightfully cause a judicious nonbeliever to think that her nonbelief
has been irrational, one can hardly extract from this that ontological
arguments do not provide judicious nonbelievers with some justification
for embracing theism. Accordingly, Oppy's conclusion (p. 199) "that
ontological arguments are completely worthless" is dialectical hyperbole
of the first order. Moreover, the latter claim seems especially odd in light
of Oppy's contention (on p. 194) "that it could be reasonable for some
theists to hold that there are sound ontological arguments." Does Oppy
really mean to suggest that some "completely worthless" arguments
could reasonably be believed by theists to be sound? It might prove
instructive to have a look at the relevant paragraph (p. 194) as a whole:
It seems to me that it could be reasonable for some theists to hold
that there are sound ontological arguments; however, the same
cannot be said for arguments that purport to show that atheists
and agnostics are, in virtue of their refusal to be persuaded of the
truth of theism by ontological arguments alone, irrational. Prima
facie, this view is absurd; and closer examination does nothing to
make it appear more plausible.
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Here again is a stark exhibition of Oppy's unfortunate conflation between
"N's being presented with a justification for accepting p," and "N's being
irrational if he / she does not accept p."
In conclusion, it seems clear that an outstanding illustration of the sort of
epistemic clumsiness that attends Oppy's analysis is afforded by his claim
that many proponents of ontological arguments (e.g., Plantinga) "have conceded that these arguments are dialectically impotent" (p. 185). What Oppy
has in mind here is Plantinga's cautionary note on p. 221 of The Nature of
Necessity regarding Anselmian arguments (including, of course, his own).
What Plantinga asserts there is that such arguments "cannot, perhaps, be
said to prove or establish 'their conclusions" (Plantinga's italics). But how
does that imply that ontological arguments are----in Oppy's words-"dialectically impotent?" (One can rest assured that Plantinga would concede no
such 'thing.) Clearly, Oppy's view can only be (or entail) that a piece of
deductive reasoning is "dialectically impotent" if it fails to be probative; i.e.,
fails to ensure that all rational persons presented with that reasoning would
be intellectually perverse or irrational if they failed to accept it. But by that
austere a standard, of course, virtually all arguments with philosophically
interesting conclusions-not just ontological arguments-would tum out to
be "worthless."
In closing, then, while there is little doubt that oppy's ambitious, comprehensive, and workmanlike book deserves thumbs up, his overall polemic
against the dialectical efficacy of ontological arguments disappointingly suffers--or so it seems to me-from some serious epistemological confusion.
NOTES
1. One might appropriately contend that ontological arguments are as
such essentially or inherently modal, and, accordingly, that it is somewhat
puzzling to regard "Modal" arguments as a type of ontological argument.
What Oppy seems to have in mind here, however, are those ontological
arguments which make explicit use of the notions of necessity and possibility.
2. Cf. Robert Merrihew Adams, "Must God Create the Best?," in
Thomas V. Morris, The Concept of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), pp. 91-106.
3. Presumably, the theists to whom Oppy is referring here are those who
would not accept theism solely on the basis of any ontological argument.

Religion, Science and Naturalism, by Willem B. Drees. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi, 314. $59.95 (cloth).
ALAN PADGETT, Azusa Pacific University
The author of this monograph, Prof. Willem Drees of the University of
Twente in the Netherlands, is a rising star in European and American
circles of scholarship concerned with religion and science. Drees has
advanced degrees in physics and also two doctorates, in theology and

